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I. INTR~DUCTION
The practice of female genital mutilation (hereinafter FGM) raises significant questions
regarding the human rights o f women and girls, but also regarding our responsibilities to each
other as individuals, groups, and sovereign states within a global community. Though some have
advocated complete Western non-involvement in the efforts to eradicate FGM, cultural sensitivity
and respect d o not demand cultural relativism o r abdication of responsibility toward others as
human beings.

Instead of the abandonment that accompanies cultural relativism, this paper

proposes that the eradication of FGM requires responses on at least three levels: the individual
level, the domestic level, and the international level. Though I will briefly discuss individual and
international approaches to confronting culturally challenging practices, the major focus of my
paper will be on the domestic question: should FGM be recognized as persecution for purposes o f
asylum?
I 1 THT PwcncE OF FEMALEGENITALMIJTILATION
Because other writers have extensively documented FGM,' I will not d o so in great detail
here. However, some basic information about FGM is necessary as a foundation for the issues I
will discuss in this paper. F G M ~is an ancient,' but ongoing, cultural practice in which girls and

' See generally NAHIDTouBlh FEMALEGENITAL MCTILATI~N:
A CALL FORGLOBAL
ACTION(Gloria Jacobs.

ed.,
DAREER.WOMAN,WHYDO YOUWEEP? (1982): FUY H o s m , THEHOSKENREPORT: GENITAL
1993): ASMAEL
AYD SEKrAL M L ~ T I OOF
N FEMXES (1983): HAWNY LIGHTFOOT-KLEW,
PRISONERS
OF m
A
L
:AN ODYSSEY
INTO FEMALE
GENITAL
MI.TIL.4TION (1982)
' 1 have chosen to call this practice FGM because it is the name most consistent wiith the outcome of the practice.
Although some commentators believe this appellation is judgmental, my intention is not to pass judgment. I do not
judge the women who perform FGM. for I believe their intentions are honorable. Though I respect ithe women who
practice FGM, I do not believe that euphemistically nanung the practice "surgery" or "circumcision" is accurate.
FGM is not medically necessary. and rarely occurs in surgical settings. Moreover, charasterizing FGM as
circumcision significantly disguises the reality of the procedure: unlike male circumcision, FGM involves the
cutting and or removal of the femalc sex organs.
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women have their sexual organs cut, scraped, and or removed. Three versions of FGM exist: 1)
clitoridectomy (partial or complete removal of the clitoris); 2) excision (removal of both the
clitoris and inner labia); and 3) infibulation (removal of the clitoris and some or all of the labia
minora, plus incision and scraping of the labia majora. Thorns hold the skin and the legs are
wrapped tightly so that a hood of skin will form and cover the urethra and most of the vagina.
This often takes as long as one month. Only a small opening remains after infibulation is
complete.).'

While clitoridectomy and excision account for approximately 85 percent of all

FGM,' in regions where infibulation is practiced, it is practiced nearly universal~y.~
All three procedures can have significant short and long term complications, including:
excessive bleeding and hemorrhaging, anemia, infection, septicemia, tetanus, retention of urine
and menstrual blood, psychological stress, shock, permanent damage to urethra or anus, repeated
bladder and urinary tract infections, deve!opment of excessive scar tissue, permanent
disfigurement, cyst formation, infertility, extreme menstrual pain, pain during sexual intercourse,
difficulty achieving sexual satisfaction, recutting for intercourse (if infbulated) and child-birth, and
death (from excessive bleeding and infection).'
Despite its serious health consequences, FGM is quite common: approximately 85 to 114
million women and girls are already genitally mutilated. "[Gllobally, at least 2 million girls a year
are at risk of genital mutilation-approximately 6,000 per day."' Depending on the region where

ToLBrq supra note 1. at 21 (FGM was practiced by the Phoenicians, Hittites, and the ancient Egyptians); Kay
Boulware-Miller. Fe~nuleCircunzcision: C'hallenges to the Practice as a Human Rights V~olarion,8 HARv.
WOMEN'SL.J. 155; 156 n.3 (1984).
Tomi& supra note 1, at 9-1 1.
' I d at 10.
id. at 11. 25 (Infibulation occurs most frequently and predominates in Somalia. Djibouti. Northern Sudan.
Southern Egypt, and coastal Ethiopia. Id~bulationalso occurs. though less frequently, in Mali, Eritrea, and
Gambia.).

'Id at 13-19.
X
Tom[& szipra note 1, at 5.
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practiced, the ritual may take place at any age from infancy to young adulthood (marriageable
age).'
FGM is practiced in approximately 40 countries around the world, including at least 26
African countries, where it is most c ~ r n m o n . ' ~It is however, also practiced on the Arabian
Peninsula, in Oman and Yemen, and by small minorities in India, Malaysia, and lndonesia.ll FGM
also occurs in immigrant communities throughout the world, including in the United States,
Europe, and Australia. l2
Because some African Muslim communities cite religion as the reason for performing
FGM, the practice is often mistakenly identified with Islam. FGM, however, is not a reli,'=lous
practice.

Orthodox (Coptic) Christians, Ethiopian Falashas (Jews who live in Israel), and

Muslims1" practice FGM, even though the Quran, the Bible, and the Torah do not require the
practice.
Rather than being a religious practice, FGM is a cultural ritual14 employed to prepare girls
for their role as women, and to initiate girls into womanhood. Although FGM is described as an
initiation ritual, in most cases the ritual takes place long before puberty and the onset of menses

l5

Although the ritual does occur in infancy, the ritual most often takes place at an age when girls
"can be made aware of the social role expected of them as women."16 Indeed, festivities and

Id. at 9 .
loid at21.
" Id at 26.
I . It 1s also important to note that FGM has occurred in the United States and England in non-immigrant
communities "[Als recently as the 1940s and 1950s. [FGM was used] to 'treat' hysteria, lesbianism,
masturbation. and other so-called female deviances." Id. at 21.
T O L ~ Isuprn
A note 1. at 3 1-32.
" i d . at 9. See also ALICEW ~ . E R & PRATIBHAPARM~,
WARRIOR
WS:
FEMALE
GENIT.~LMUTILATION
.4ND
THE SWAL BLINDINGOF WOMEN244, 246 (1993) (hereinafter WARRIOR
MARKS) (in an interview with Alice
Walker. Efua Dorkenoo described FGM as a "social practice" and tradition.).
15
Tomiq supra note I, at 9 ("Most commonly, girls espelience FGM between four and eight years of age").
"Id.

"
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other rituals that celebrate womanhood and the passage into womanhood often accompany the
cutting ritual.. More specifically, in Western Africa, the ritual cutting occurs within 'secret
societies," which also provide formal training and education about the role of women in society."
In addition to educating girls about their role as women, many other reasons are given for
the practice of FGM, including: "ensuring the virginity of a woman before marriage and inducing
chastity for divorced women or married women whose husbands are away; birth control; initiation
into and celebration of womanhood; hygienic reasons; and religious requirements."18 Nahld
Toubia characterizes the reasons given for the practice of FGM as motivated by: 1) notions of
beautylcleanliness; 2) desire for male protectionlapproval; 3) health concerns; 4) religion; and 5 )
morality

l9

Because the reasons for FGM are both important and traditional to members of the

practicing society, failure to undergo FGM can have serious social and economic consequences
for young women. Young girls who do not experience FGM are ostracized,*' and are often
unable to marry2' Inability to marry can have devastating economic consequences because
"marriage is a primary path to social and econotnic survival and a d ~ a n c e m e n t . " ~ ~
111. ERADICATING
FGM: PROBLEMS OF CT.JLTIJRAL
II\/IPERIAI~ISM& CTLTIJRALRELATIVISM

''

'Clatter of .LL A'.. A72-374-558 (IJ Arlington. Va. Aug. 9, 1995), at 6 (the purpose of the secret societies is "to
inculcatc young women on their socially-imposed roles."). See also Hope Lewis: Between lrurr and "Female
C;enital .L./uriiarion ":Feminist Hu~nanRights Discourse and the C~tlturalDivide, 8 HARv. H ~ IRTS.
. J. I, 4 (1995)
(FGM rituals involve "educational and socialization rites."): TOLBIA,supra note 1, a1 18, 29.
18
Isabelle R. Gunning. ,lrrogant Perceplion. 14forid-Trmeling anrlhfulticultural Ferninistn: The Case ofFernole
Genital Surgeries. 23 C o ~ u uHr:M.
.
RTS. L. R E V . 189; 195-196 (1991-92)(hereinafterArrogantPerception). See
also Boulware-Miller. supra note 3; at 157 (FGM is seen as increasing fertility and live hinhs, improving women's
hygiene and the "aesthetic condition of female genitalia." and enhancing male semal pleasure).
l 9 TOIIBI.~.
.suprn note I. at 37.
O' Awwx W~\RS.&ME,
F E M ,CIRCLWCISIOS:
~
STRATEGIES
TO B r n ~A B O CHANGE
~
(quoted in Tolrelq supra note
1, at 11): W A R R I O R M ~supra
S . note 14. at 322.
TOLBIA.supra note 1. at 6, 37. .'The practice is . . . a prerequisite for marriage. To ensure that the woman's
family receives the requisite bride price from the groom's family. the bride must be able to prove that she has
WOMEN:FEMALE
GE?JIT.4L MUTILATION
3
undergone female genital mutilation." DEP'T01:JUSTICE,ALERTSERIES:
(199l)(hereinafter ALERTSERIES).
BOUI,W.W-MILLER,supra note 3, at 157-158.

"

''
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Though FGM is a common practice effecting vast numbers of women and girls, it is not
universally condoned. Commentators from the West and, more significantly, from within the
cultures that practice FGM, have criticized the practice.'3 ~ c c o r d i nto~Nahid Toubia, Sudan's
first female surgeon, FGM "is an extreme example of efforts common to societies around the
world to suppress women's sexuality, ensure their subjugation and control their reproductive
f U n ~ t i o n s . "Interestingly,
~~
both men and women in cultures that practice FGM understand that
FGM has "patriarchal underpinnings" and that FGM is one way "in which women come to accept
their secondary status."25 Anned with this knowledge, as well as knowledge of the physical and
psychological damage that FGM can cause, African and Western women began efforts to
eliminate FGM.
In the 1970s and 1980s, when worldwide attention first focused on FGM, internal
criticism of this cultural ritual was experienced quite differently than was criticism that originated
in the West. African communities received the criticism leveled by Western Feminists and western
media as particularly intrusive and reckless. The legacy of colonialism, combined with arrogant
and condescending criticism from abroad, made Africans hesitant to work with Western women
with similar goals. Indeed, many African organizations specifically suggested that any efforts to
confront the practice of FGM must be made only by Africans
African women were motivated to exclude western women from the process of
eradicating FGM partially out of a sense of pride in their people and culture .26 African women

23 The Somali Democratic Women's Orga~zation.
"Le mouvement Femmes et Societe" in Senegal. the Union
Nationale des Femmes du Mali, the Babiker Bedri Foundation for Women's Studies and Research in Sudan, and
the Association of African Women in Research and Development. are all indigenous groups who denounce FGM.
l4TOL%I.A,
supra note 1, at 5 .
" I d . at 35. See also W A R R I O R M ~supm
I ~ ; note 14. at 218-249. 252-253 ( i n t e ~ e w
with Efua Dorkenoo).
26
Arrogant Perception, supra note 18, at 221.
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also excluded western women because they judged this cultural practice as "barbaric" without
In essentializing womanhood,
considering the value FGM served in African cotn~nunities.~~

western women did not address the politics and conditions of the African women's struggle. As a
result, the western feminists' concerns did not ring-true to African women.28
Even African women who oppose the practice [of FGM] often resent what they
perceive as condescension from Western Feminists who seek to end all African
women's problems by crusading against this one practice. Western feminists often
fail to realize that although sexual and reproducrive freedoms are central to their
feminist struggles, health, food, education, and childcare may figure more centrally
in the struggles of other women.29

Western Feminists' failure to see the broader context in which FGM occurs, particularly
the broader socio-economic context, alienated them from African women with the same goal.
This failure to understand and to communicate across cultures raises challenging questions for
those who believe that women and girls should not be subjected to mutilation of their sexual
organs. Is cultural relativism the only appropriate response? Or is there a way for Westerners,
and western nations, to respond to this practice in a way that is respecthl of women and girls'
physical and psychological health, as well as respecthl of the culture in which FGM is practiced?
"The crucial issue is how to strike a balance between respect for cultural diversity (and the
containment of cultural imperialism) and the attainment of human dignity for women."30

" Nancv Kim. TownrdA Feminist Theory ofHzrtnan Rights: Straddling the Fence Between Western Imnperialism

and C'ncriticoldb.solut~sm~
25 Co~t:&f.
HUM. Rrs. L. REV. 19, 99 (1993): "In the 1970s. many Western femi~sts
condemned the practice of female sexual surgeries as a barbaric way from males to control the sexuality of women.
They refused to recognize the cultural purposes served by the practice. As a result. many African femi~stswere
forced to choose between ending sexual surgeries and maintaining loyalty to their cultnre. Wlule the may have
wanted to end the practice, many were. and are, unwilling to end it for the purposes set forth by Western

feminists."
" Margareth Etienne. Addressing Gender-Based Violence in an Inrernalional Context, 18 KWv. WOMEN'SL.J.

139, 162 (1995).
z9 Id.

30

Kim. supra note 27. at 85-86
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We must strike this balance on a variety of planes: on a personal, individual level; on the
level of international cooperation; and as a sovereign nation. As individuals, we must adopt the
"world-traveling" approach advocated by Isabelle R. ~ u n n i n g . ~To
' achieve this balance in the
context of international organizations will require leadership from the regions where the
"culturally challenxing practice" occurs, as well as patient cooperation from other regions.
Finally, as a sovereign nation, we must adopt a rehgee-friendly policy protective of individual
women and girls at risk of forced FGM.
A. "World Traveling"

World Traveling describes an approach to be used by individuals concerned with practices
like FGM, but who are also concerned with maintaining respect for other cultures and
perspectives. "The methodology is a process to use in perceiving and understanding [culturally
challenging] practices within their cultural context and relies upon a multicultural dialogue as a
way to encourage the evolution of more shared va~ues."'~ The World Traveling method involves
adopting three different perspectives: 1) seeing oneself in historical context; 2) seeing oneself as
the "other" sees you; and 3) seeing the "other" in her own context. The point of adopting the
three perspectives is to enhance recognition of both our independence from others, as well as our
interconnectedness.
In the context of FGM, seeing oneself in historical context requires, for western feminists,
recognition that FGM has been performed in our home countries as well as in Africa.
Furthermore, the ordering of sexuality and gender achieved by FGM, is achieved in the United
States as successfully, if by different means. Similarly, seeing oneself as the "other" sees you,

" Arrogant Perception. supru note 18, passim
3 ' ~ dat 193.
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involves recognition that African feminists may find "Western articulations of concern . . . as only
thinly disguised expressions of racial and cultural superiority and imperialism."3i This, of course,
results from a history of imperialism and racism. Finally, seeing the "other" in her own context
requires "understanding that any single event or norm is a part of a larger, complex, organic social
envir~nment."'~Grasping the complexity of the social environment surrounding FGM involves
identifying practices in our own culture that would be challenging or negative to others, and

absorbing all of the detail surrounding the practices we find challenging elsewhere. Adopting this
World Traveling approach as an individual will enhance our understanding of other cultures, and
prevent us from imposing our own views on others in a condescending and self-righteous manner.

B. Balancinn Cultural Respect with Women's Rights on the International Plane
Adoption of an international approach to eradicating FGM, spearheaded by leaders from
the regions where FGM is practiced, implicitly rejects cultural relativism. Cultural relativism is no
longer a defensible response to complicated, ethical and cultural issues because it fails "to
recognize the difference between cultural sensitivity and cultural stagnation attributable to power
imbalances within societies

. . .

The relativist approach to culture, an absolutist one, does not

consider minority viewpoints and beliefs that coexist with and are subsumed within the dominant
'culture' or social group.

,,;s

Instead of adopting a purely relativist approach, in which FGM is examined for its value
solely as a cultural practice, international organizations should adopt a balancing test.

The

Working Group on Traditional Practices adopted a balancing test that weighed "the cultural

p~

Id at 212.
" I d . at 213.
35
Kim, .supra note 27. at 103.
33
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function of female circumcision against the hami%l consequence^."'^ Thus, the Working Group
balanced the physical and psychological consequences to women and girls against the two
identified cultural functions of FGM: as a ritual passage into womanhood and as a test of a girl's
"capacity to endure acute suffering and cope with the future pain of childbi~th."~'Based on this
balancing, and their assessment that these cultural functions were obsolete, the Working Group
determined that the cultural value of FGM was outweighed by the need to protect the physical
and psychological health of women and girls. This balancing approach is valuable because of its
honesty within the cultural contours of the society in question.: the contemporary cultural value of
FGM is considered, but is not presumptively more valuable than women's health, as it would be
under a cultural relativist's model.

C Granting Asvlum
Completely distinct from any questions regarding the propriety of Western involvement or
intervention in African culture is the question of whether or not the practice of FGM can satisfy
the persecution requirement for asylum or withholding of deportation within United States
Immigration Law. What distinguishes treatment of FGbI in the context of asylum from attempts
to eradicate its practice abroad is that granting asylum is an enactment of United States' culture
Granting asylum based on domestic law does
and jurisprudence, within United States territo~y.~'
not interfere with the domestic, cultural affairs of another state. Granting asylum is not an
unfriendly act:

It is important to understand that, in recognizing gender-based asylum claims . . .
the United States Courts are not creating any standard of behavior for other
-

~

3brrogant Perception. supra note 18, at 389.
37 Id
T h s is consistent. in both principle and practice, with the temtolial principle under international law, and is

''

consistent with international human rights law. as well.
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societies. Rather, we are creating the standard by which this country will serve as
a r e h g e for women who are being persecuted because o f their gender.39

Given the parallel and pressing imperatives of respecting other cultures, non-interference
with other states, and the desire to eradicate practices that are physically, psycholo@cally, and
socially damaging to women (whether or not we define such challen@ng cultural practices as
human rights violations), the granting o f asylum is appropriate: by granting asylum in cases o f
persecution based on FGM, the United States will neither interfere with the internal affairs of
other states, nor impose its cultural values on any group of people within their own culture. Yet,
by granting asylum, the United States will help persecuted individuals who are deserving of
assistance and protection, while also contributing to the development of a customary norm against
FGM.
While a customary norm prohibiting FGM does not currently exist; granting asylum
contributes to the ongoing international dialogue regarding this practice. Although the United
Nations has declared that FGM is a violation of human rights," a number o f states have outlawed
its practice," and both the United States and Canada have granted asylum and suspension o f
deportation based on FGM-based persecution,4z France recently denied asylum to Aminata Diop,

391Matterof' 1Lf. K..supra note 17.
UN General Assembly Resolution 181104. the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.
states that "v~olenceagainst women both violates and impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human tights
and fundamental freedoms" and that "[~iolenceagainst women shall be understood to encompass . . . female
genital mutilation." ALERTSERIES,
.supra note 21. at 5-6.
See also U.N. Sub-Comm'n on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities Res. 1988134.
U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/1988115at 62 (1988) (d~scussedin Katherine Breman, The Influence ofCultural
Relatrvisr,~on Infernational Human Rjzhhrs Law: Female Circumcision as a Case Study, 7 LAW & INEQ. 367, 392

(1989)).
Cameroon, Djibouti. Egypt. Ghana. the Sudan. the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Switzerland have either
outlawed or restricted FGM. Australia, Canada, and France apply existing laws to ban FGM. Mary Ann James,
Recent Development. 9 BEIUCELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 206 (1994).
" ~ a t r e of,bf
r
K., supra note 17; A4arter ofOluloro. No. A72-1471191 (11Portland. Or. March 23, 1994);Matter
of Salinr (discussed in Randy Furst, A Child Is Spared; Fmnilv Escapes Deportntion, Their Dauzhter 's Ritual
41
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a Malian woman who refused to undergo F G M . ~As
~ yet, then, states practice is not sufficiently
consistent and wide-spread to constitute a norm of customary international law. If, however, over
time, states practice becomes consistent in granting asylum based on FGM, then states that allow
FGM will be under pressure to eradicate the practice. Although waiting for a customary norm to
develop may require patience, it is a culturally appropriate way to proceed, for if a customary
norm develops, it will represent the view of the world community that FGM violates human
rights, and will not represent hrther Western cultural imperialism.
AS PERSECIJ-~I(IN
FOR PIJRPOSES
OF Asnmf CLAIMS
IV. FEMALEGENITALMTJTXATION

Five U.S. Immigration Courts have addressed the question of whether asylum, suspension
of deportation, or withholding of deportation, should be granted on the basis of FGM. In Matter
of Oluloro, a Nigerian woman was granted a suspension of deportation because of the extreme

hardship her two American citizen children would face if Oluloro were deported to Nigeria. In
that case, the Immigration Judge (hereinafter IJ) held that the risk of FGM being performed on
Oluloro's two daughters would create extreme hardship. In order to avoid such hardship, the
Immigration Judge granted a suspension of deportation."
Similarly, a Bloomington IJ granted suspension of deportation to a Palestinian couple
because their U S . citizen daughter would face extreme hardship if they were deported to Saudi
Arabia.

The U agreed that Layla Salim, the couple's seven year old daughter, would be

.

.bfutilation, ST.* TRIB. Mar. 25, 1994. at 1B). According to Lewis, supra note 17, at 53. Canada granted refugee
status to Khadra Hassan Fara, a Somali woman who feared that her daughter would be forced to undergo FGM if
they were sent back to Somalia.
43
Aminata Diop's case was discussed in Lewis, supra note 17. at 22. and in WARRIORW,supra note 14, at
255-257.
44
Matter of Oluloro. .supra note 12.
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"subjected to extreme hardship in the form of female genital mutilation" if she were deported to
Saudi Arabia, despite her parents opposition to the practice.J5
In M a t t e r

of M.

K.,the IJ granted asylum under 9 208(a) of the Immigration and

Nationality ~ c t "(hereinafter MA) to a woman who resisted mutilation for nearly ten years, and
who ran away from her home and family to avoid FGM, but who was later abducted and forced to
undergo FGM. In this case, the FGM was already performed, and there was no child to protect
from the extreme hardship of undergoing FGM. Nonetheless, the IJ found there was sufficient
evidence of the likelihood of future persecution to warrant a granting of asylum. Moreover, the IJ
found that the circumstances of M.K.'s mutilation were so severe as to warrant a granting of
asylum based on humanitarian concern~.~'
In the remaining two cases, M a t t e r of 5." and M a t t e r of ~ a s r i z g a , " the Immigration
Judges denied relief based on FGM. In Matter of J, the IJ considered an asylum petition based on
fear of FGM being performed on the petitioner's children if they returned to Sierra Leone.
Despite remarkably similar circumstances as occurred in M u t t e r of M.K., the IJ in this case
rejected the petition. As in Marter of M.K., the petitioner was from Sierra Leone, was abducted
and forced to undergo FGM, and was forced, on pain of death, to swear silence regarding her
treatment. Although the U in M.K. found this amounted to persecution, the U in M a t t e r of J did
not agree and J ' s asylum petition was denied.

45

Furst. supra note 12.

" Immigration and Nationaliv Act. 8 U.S.C. g 1158.
47

iMaNer of;\%R, supra note 17, at 23
iMnfter o f J , No. A72-370-565 ( I J Baltimore. Md. Apr. 28. 1995)(reported in .&fore on 1J Decision Granting
Asylum Bused 0 1 7 Genital iMutilation, 72 1NTERF'W;TER RELEASES 1188 (Sept. 1, 1995) and Still ,More on Asylum
Claincs Relating to Female Genital l!4utilafion. 72 INTERPRETER
RELEASES1375 (Oct. 6, 1995)).
49MatterofKasinga. No. A73-476-695 ( I J Philadelphia. Pa. Aug. 25. 1995).
48
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Finally, in Matter ofKasingu, the teen-age petitioner fled her homeland of Togo in order
to avoid imminent, forced genital mutilation and an arranged, polygamous marriage. Ms. Kasinga
was able to avoid FGM, which is essentially compulsory among her tribe in Togo, because her
father was a wealthy and powerful man, who did not believe in the practice. When her father
died, the petitioner's aunt arranged her marriage to a man who already had three other wives.
Kasinga objected to the marriage, and refused to sign the marriage certificate. Shortly after the
official marriage ceremony, and just prior to her scheduled circumcision,^ Kasinga's sister helped
her escape to Ghana, where Kasinga took the first flight out of the country. Petitioner eventually
came t o the United States in order to seek asylum in a country where she had relatives.
Despite these compelling circumstances, the IJ denied Kasinga's request for asylum. He
did not find her testimony credible;jOindeed, he found her testimony to be irrational, inconsistent,
and inherently ~ n ~ e r s u a s i v e . ~This,
'
however, can be attributed to Kasinga's devastatingly
inadequate legal representations2 More significantly, the IJ found: 1) petitioner's fear of forced
genital mutilation and forced polygamous marriage upon return to Togo did not demonstrate past
or fiture persecution; 2) even if there were evidence of persecution, there was no nexus to a
category protected by the statute (Kasinga was not persecuted because of membership in a
particular social group); and 3) petitioner failed to show government action or acquiescence
because she never approached the government for protection.53

50 The IJ's finding that Kasinga lacked credibility raises sigmfiwnt questions and highlights the difficulty of
analyzing gender-based asylum claims. Although a detailed discussion of the problems that arise in assessing
credibiliN is beyond the scope of this paper, it is imponant to note that the IJ in the Kasinga case did not take
follow the recommendations contained in the Considerations regarding DemeanorICredibili~Issues. PHYLLIS
COVEN.
U.S. DEP'T.OF JUSTICE: CONSIDER~'~IOXSFORASYLLW OFFICERS AD~JDIC,\TING
ASYLLWCLAIMSFROM
WOMEN 6-7 (1995). reprinted in class materials for March 8, 1996 (hereinafterCONSIDERTIONS).

" Id at 10.

'' Applicant's Brief on Appeal From Decision of the Immigration Judge at 1-3, MafferofKasinga, No. A73176695.
53

Matter ofKasinga. supra

note 19. at 11-12.
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These inconsistent holdings demonstrate a significant problem women face when bringing
an asylum petition based on FGM as persecution: there is no binding precedent on this matter.
"Although the I.N.S. has issued guidelines on gender-based persecution, there does not yet seem
to be a consensus among IJs or within the I.N.S. that genital mutilation constitutes such
persecution."54 The Kasinga case, however, may bring some resolution to this question in the
near future: Matter of Kasinga is scheduled for oral argument on May 2, 1996 before the Board
of Immigration Appealssi If published, this decision will become binding precedent on all
Immigration Judges. Because of the importance of the question, and the need to resolve the
inconsistency among IJs, it is likely that the Kasinga decision will be published
In addition, there are good reasons to believe that the BIA will find that FGM may serve
as the basis for women's asylum claims. First, the Government's Brief in Kasinga's appeal, rather
than objecting to all such asylum claims based on FGM, takes a particularly moderate position on
the issue: "certain potential victims of FGhf may indeed establish eligibility for asylum and
withholding of deportation."56 Second, the Department of Justice recently issued their
"Considerations for Asylum OEcers Adjudicating Asylum Claims From omen,"^' which
provides an international and comparative law back-drop for analysis of gender based claimss"
The Considerations encourage asylum officers to consider the Canadian Guidelines on Women
Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, Canadian immigration rulings, the
UNHCR Handbook, and other international instruments when rendering decisions in gender-

on IJDecision (;rantin,oAsylunr Based on Genital:b1utilation. supra note 48.
Celia W. Dugger. IFo~nanS Plea For.4qlurn Puts li.ibulRilun1 On Triul, N.Y. TIMES, Apnl 15, 1996, at A l .
s6 Govemment's Brief in Response to Applicant's Appeal From Decision of Immigration Judge, Matter ofKasingo
at 15, No. A73-176-695.
" CONSIDERTIONS.
supra note 50.
58 Id at 1 3 .
.\%re
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related claims. Moreover, under these Considerations, breaching social mores, by marrying
outside of an arranged marriage, or by otherwise failing to comply with cultural or religious
norms, can result in persecution.3"ven

the government's increasing willingness to grant asylum

for gender-related claims, it will be difficult for the BIA to completely bar all asylum claims based
on FGM.
Under United States Immigration Law, asylum may be granted to a petitioner who, by a
satisfies the refugee definition set out in $ 101(a)(42) of the
preponderance of the e~idence,~'
I N A . ~A
' person is a refugee if she is outside her country, and if she is unable or unwilling to

avail herself of the protection of her country because of a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.62 This definition has been construed by the courts as having four elements: 1) wellfounded fear; 2) of persecution; 3) on account of one of the five protected categories (the "nexus"
requirement), and 4) government action or acquiescence (such that the petitioner is unwilling or
unable to avail herself of the state's protection).
A. Well-Founded Fear
To be a rehgee, one must have a well-founded fear of persecution. Well-founded fear
"'means that a person has either been actually a victim of persecution or can show good reason
why he fears persecution."'6'

According to federal regulations, an applicant "may qualify as a

rehgee either because he has suffered actual past persecution or because he has a well-founded

"Id. at 4.
M
I..V.S v. Cardoza-Fonseca. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. $ 1101.
62 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, ;an. I (A&?), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS
HIGH
COMMISSIONER
ON RER!GEES. HANDBOOK
ON PROCEDURES
AND C R ~ R IFOR
A DETERMINING
REFUGEESTATUS
(1992) (hereinafter UNHCR H~XDBOOK).
" Cardoza-Fonseca, mpra note 60. at 438 (citation omitted).
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fear of h t u r e persecution."64 Thus, if the petitioner has already experienced persecution, she
presumptively has a well-founded fear of per~ecution.~'A petitioner who has not yet been the
victim of persecution must prove that there is a reasonable possibility of hture persecution.66
This standard has been interpreted to have both a subjective component and an objective
component.h7 Accordingly, the petitioner must actually feel fearful, and, the fear must be
objectively reasonable. A reasonable possibility of persecution does not mean that the petitioner is
more likely than not going to be the victim of persecution.68 Rather, if the petitioner has a one-inten chance of experiencing future persecution, then she faces a reasonable possibility of future
persecution.69
In the FGM asylum cases already decided, both petitioners objected to FGM, were victims
of forced FGM, and were threatened with death if they revealed anything about those who
performed the ~ ~ h . 1 .In~ 'the Matter of M.K., the IJ held that "Respondent was previously
persecuted by having female genital mutilation forcibly imposed on her."7' This alone would
satisfy the refkgee definition7' However, the IJ went on to hold that the petitioner also has a
well-founded fear of "future persecution because of the threat made by the Bundo

to kill

those who reveal their 'secret."'74

G4
65

8 C F.R.6 20813b).
W C R %AVDBWK, supra note 62 at para. 45; 8 C.F.R. g 20813(b)(l)(i)

I N S v .Stevic. 167 U S . 407.424-125 (1984).
" UNHCR HAVDBOOK;
supra note 62. at para. 3 8 ~

Cardoza-Fonseca, supra note 60. at 438.
at 43 1.
70
.bfatferofJ, supra note 48. at 1265: Matrer o j ' M K ,supra note 17, at 7-8.
'I Id. at 12.
8 C.F.R.
g 208.13@)(l)(i).
'3 The Bundo Society is a secret women's society in Sierra Leone that performs the FGM ceremony and provides
gender-role education to girls.
7.1
~bfatfer
of:\dI;. supru note 17, at 12
69 I d

''
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In the Matter o f J , however, the IJ held that the petitioner did not have a well-founded
fear of persecution. According to the U, the petitioner's previous experience of forced FGM did
not amount to persecution. As a result, her fear was not presumptively well-founded, and she
would have to prove that there was a reasonable possibility of future persecution. Neither 1,'s
fear of retribution for havins exposed the Bundo Society during her asylum hearings," nor her
fear of the likely mutilation of her daughters satisfied the U that a reasonable possibility of
persecution existed.
The basis for the IJ's conclusion is unclear. However, it is possible that the U used a
narrow reading of well-founded fear that required the fear to be personal, to be a fear of being
persecuted oneself

If the IJ applied such a narrow reading, then J.'s fear of her daughter's

mutilation would not satisfy the well-founded fear requirement. While the Interpreter Releases
did not report such a narrow reading, another IJ required personal fear in a similar circumstan~e.'~
In Matter of Olzrloro, the IJ denied a petition for asylum when a Nigerian woman who had
undergone FGM requested asylum based on her fear that her daughters would be forcibly
mutilated. The 1J construed the well-founded fear requirement to mean fear for oneself, not for
others7'
B. Persecution

" A petitioner's views and testimony are "made public in the course of [asylum] proceedings [and] are not
concealed" from the relevant authorities. Furthermore. Lf the testimony in an asylum proceeding "is not shielded
from the govemment of the countp to which a person may be returned, it is only fair to take chat testimony into
account in determining whether a petitioner has a basis for believing that the government will persecute her if she
is returned.'. Fisher v. IVS. 1996 WL 116681 (9th Cir.)(Noonen. I.. dissenting).
.6 Matter ofOluloi-o, supra note 12 (discussed in Patricia Dysan Rudloff. In Re Oluloro: Risk of Female Genital
Mutilation .As "Extrerne Hardship " in lrnmigrotion Proceedirfgs, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 877, 901 (1995)).
77
Although the I1 in the Oluloro case denied asylum, he did grant a suspension of depoltation to the petitioner
because of the exTreme hardshp her daughters would face if hey were forced to submit to FGM. The IJ in Matter
of J did not grant any form of relief to J. Tius, however, may be due to the IJ's conclusion that FGM is not
persecution, and that women who are victims of forced FGM are not members of a particular social group.
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Although persecution is not conclusively defined anywhere, "it may be inferred that a
threat to life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership
of a particular social group is always persecution. Other serious violations of human rights - for
the same reasons

-

would also constitute persecution."78 Within United States jurisprudence,

persecution has been defined to include t o r t ~ r e , 'confinement,80
~
and rape," as well as "threat to
the life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who differ in a way
regarded as o f f e n ~ i v e . " ~ ~
In Matter of M.K., the U defined persecution as "harm or suffering inflicred upon persons
to punish them for possessing a belief or characteristic the persecutor seeks to o v e r c ~ m e . "Like
~~
most definitions of persecution, the definition relied upon by the IJ in Matter of M.K. indicated
that some attention should be paid to the persecutor's intent to harm or punish the victim. Yet,
the IJ did not inquire into the persecutor's motives. Because FGM is performed, not out of
malice, but out of a desire to bind the individual to the society and to create a sense of belonging
in the community, the IJ was correct to abandon this inquiry. If malice were "always required
before persecution is found, then FGM would rarely be considered persecution."8J

The

Government's brief in Matter 9fKas;nga argues that this standard requiring malignant or punitive
intent is appropriate in most circumstances, but articulates an exception to the general rule for
practices which, by their very nature, are so extreme as to be shocking.85 According to the
--

'' UNHCR H ~ D R O O Ksupra
. note 62. at para. 51

79
SO

"

Guevara Flores v I..V.S, 786 F2d 1212. 1219 (5th Cir. 1986)

,,

1'1.

Lazo-~bfaianov. I.N.S., 813 F.2d 1-132. 1131 (9th Cir. 1987).
8'hfatter ofdcosia, 19 I.&N. Dec. 211. 222 (BIA 1985). See also Hernandez-Orti: v. I..\'.S. 777 F.2d 509. 516
(9th Cir. 1985)(persecution is oppression inflicted on orhen because of a difference in views or status that the
persecutor will not tolerate); Kovac v. I N S . 107 F.2d 102; 107 (9th Cir. 1969).
33
Marter oJ'41.X. supra note 17, at 12 (citing .lcosta, supra note 82).
84
Government's Brief. :bfatterofKasinga, supra note 56. at 16.
SS id. at 17.
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government, FGM, in its most severe form, "shocks the conscience because it amounts to an
extreme bodily invasion .

. .

Female genital mutilation therefore can amount to persecution even if

the subjective intention of the one who would perform the circumcision is ostensibly benign."86
Concern over the extremity of the mistreatment seems consistent Wlth the IJ's decision in
Marter of M.K. Rather than even discussing the persecutor's intent, the IJ focused on four
categories of persecution: 1) extreme physical, psychological, and verbal abuse; 2) serious
violations of human rights; 3) discriminatory treatment that leads .to consequences of a
substantially prejudicial nature; and 4) a combination of harms which cumulatively produce a wellfounded fear of persecution. M.K., according to the IJ, experienced past persecution because
forced FGM, resulting in physical and psychological harm, was both a violation of her human
rights and discrimination. Thus, the IJ's finding of past persecution relied on a combination of
types of persecution, thereby avoiding the question of intent entirely.

C. The Nexus Requirement
In order to be eligible for asylum, the claimant must prove that her persecution is "on
account o f ' race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.87 The difficulty for women seeking asylum based on persecution because of gender is
obvious- there is no statutory ground for gender-based persecution. Nonetheless, women have
been able to meet the nexus requirement by using gender in conjunction with another statutory
ground, such as political opinion,s8 and membership in a particular social group.89 Because FGM
is not a religious practice, I will not discuss religion as an avenue for asylum based on FGM.

86 Id

INA tj 101(a)(12).
Fafin v. f..V.S., 12 F3d 1233 (3rd Cir. 1993): .\fatter o f M b . supra note 17, at 19-21; Matter o f A and Z, A72190-893 (IJ Arlington, Va. Dec. 20 1994).
89
Farin, supra note 88: :l.fatfer0f~b1.K..supra note 17, at 17-19: ,lfatter ofil and Z , supra note 88, at 17-19.
87
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Political opinion and membership in a particular social group are relevant to FGM, however, and
have been used successfully by petitioners seeking asylum based on FGM in the United States.
1. Political Opinion
In addition to meeting all of the other statutory requirements for asylum. an alien seeking
asylum based on political opinion, "must (I) specify the political opinion on which he or she relies,
[and] (2) show that he or she holds that opinion."90 The courts have construed "political opinion"
somewhat broadly, so that political opinion includes not only attitudes about one's government,
but also includes opinions
relating to the treatment and status of women senerally within her country or
culture, or within her social, religious, or ethnic group. In addition, it includes a
woman's opposition to a particular law or mandated traditional custom that
restricts women's (but not men's) individual autonomy or movement; restricts
women's (but not men's) legal rights or access to education, employment, health
care, etc.; or it imposes affirmative requirements not imposed on men.9'
Consistent with these requiremenrs, the IJ in Matter

of

M.K. found that forced FGM can

amount to persecution on account of political opinion when a petitioner resists and complains
about FGM, as did M.K." Central to the IJ's holding, however, was that the FGM be forced, and
that the petitioner have actively resisted the practice.

Nonetheless,

the

IJ

noted

that

persecution based on political opinion exists when the persecutor perceives the petitioner to hold
antagonistic opinions because she refuses to conform to cultural norms and roles, even though she
does not protest those practices, norms, and roles."

This holding, however, seems to contradict

the Supreme Court's earlier holding in INS v. EIias-~~zcarias.~~
1n that case, the court effectively

Fotm, suprir note 88, at 1242.
supra note 17, at 19
9' Id. at 14. 17.
93 Id at 20.
9' :Matter of MFC.

94

112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
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held that imputed political opinion is insufficient to satisfy the nexus requirement because there is
no symmetry berween the victim's self-perception and the persecutor's motivation. In other
words, even if the persecutor is motivated by a perceived clash in opinion (because the victim is
not acting in accordance with the persecutor's politically motivated expectations), there is no
nexus. Under Elias-Zacarias, the required nexus only exists when the victim espouses her
political opinion. The Hias-Zacarias opinion appears to limit women fleeing FGM to claiming
asylum based on membership in a particular social group

2. Membership in a Particular Social Grouo
Membership in a particular social group provides another avenue for gender based asylum
claims, and has been used both successhlly and unsuccessfully in relation to FGM-based claims.
This inconsistency reflects the variety of standards used to define panicular social group in
different circuits. Thus, while this category may be the most promising for women seeking rehge
from FGM, it is also somewhat murky.
The UNHCR Handbook defines particular social group as a group wirh a "similarity of
background, habits or social status."95 This definition is quite broad, and was intended to be
flexible.96 The BIA, in Matter ofdcosttr, created a slightly more restrictive definition, when it
held that a particular social group is
a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The
shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex . . . or in some
circumstances it might be a shared past experience . . . whatever the common
characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the members of the group
either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is
hndamental to their individual identities or conscience^.^'

UNHCR H.~vDBooa.supra note 62 at para. 77.
%Nancy Kelly. Gencfer-ReIatedPersecution:dsessing the Aqvlum Claims of Women, 26 CORNELLLW'LL.~.625,
618 (1993)(discussing the traveaus preparatoires).
!x
Matter ofAcosla, supra note 82, at 233
95
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This definition focuses on immutable characteristics, but still opens the door to claims
based on FGM because of its explicit recognition of sex as a group characteristic. In addition, this
definition also recognizes that there are some characteristics or beliefs that should not be
negotiable because alteration would be abhorrent to the individual required to change.
The First Circuit effectively combined the UNHCR HANDBOOK and Acosta definitions
when it found that the petitioner, a Ghanian woman "associated with the former government,"
who is a member of the Ashanti tribe, and who was among a class of professional, educated,
business-people, was a member of a particular social group for asylum purposes. According to
the court, these characteristics were "essentially beyond [her] power to change."98 Under any of
these definitions, women seeking asylum, like M.K., Kasinga, and J., because FGM is so contrary
to their beliefs that it would be abhorrent to them to undergo the ritual, should be entitled to
asylum as a member of a particular social group.
If the courts continue to apply a broad version of particular social group, FGM-based
claims will be successfi~l.However, in courts that follow a definition similar to that imposed by
the Ninth Circuit, these claims will be more difficult. The Ninth Circuit has created a four-part
test to determine whether a particular social group exists. The test requires. 1) a close affiliation
among the group members; 2) a common interest upon which the affiliation is based; 3) voluntary
association, and 4) a common trait that distinguishes the group members from the general
population.99 This test would be quite difficult for women fleeing FGM to meet because it is
unlikely that the women and girls who refuse to undergo FGM have any kind of close affiliation,
or any voluntary association, in most circumstances, these women and girls are ostracized. For

p~

98~naneh-Firemnpong
v. I1\SS 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 3985).
" Sonchez-Trujillo v. IMS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
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this reason alone, women who refuse FGM are unlikely to publicly identify each other or maintain
a voluntary association
The Second Circuit has employed a "compromise" definition that requires members of a
particular social group to possess a "fundamental characteristic in common which serves to
distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor -- or in the eyes of the outside world in general."100
This definition combines the immutable or fundamental characteristic requirement of the Acosta
test with the group-identification requirements of the Ninth Circuit.

This particular definition

would not be impossible to meet for women seeking asylum in order to escape persecution based
on FGM: women and girls in this group share the immutable characteristic of sex and are
identifiable by the persecutor because they refuse to comply with cultural norms and rituals.
In Matter of M.K., the court granted asylum based on both political opinion and
membership in a particular social group. In that case, M.K. was a member of "the sub-group of
Sierra Leone women who are forced to undergo female genital mutilation" because of their
opposition to the practice.101 In this case, as in E'alnl and fisher; membership in a particular
social group overlapped with another protected category.

The overlap arises out of the

petitioner's failure to comply with some societal, cultural, or religious norm. Failure to comply
with social expectations regarding culture, religion, or politics, thereby becomes part of the
defining characteristic of the particular social group to which the petitioner belongs, and becomes
the characteristic by which the persecutor is able to identify the group members.
D. Government Action or Acauiescence

I"
101

Gomez v. INS. 947 F.2d 660 (2nd Cir. 1991).
.Warter o f M K . , supra note 17. at 18 (emphasis added).
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The W C R Handbook recognizes that persecution does not always occur at the hands of
the government.lo2 Indeed, the persecution may often come
from sections of the population that do not respect the standards established by the
laws of the country concerned . . . Where serious discriminatory or other offensive
acts are committed by the local populace, they can be considered as persecution if
they are knowingly tolerated by the authorities or if the authorities refuse, or prove
unable, to offer effective protection'O3

The BIA has construed our asylum statute consistently with the UNHCR's recommended
interpretation, such that persecution by non-governmental actors will satisfy the statute if the
government acquiesced in the persecution by failing to protect the victims (either because they
chose not to act, or because they were unable to control the

persecutor^).'^^

Although some countries in which FGM is practiced have taken steps t o eradicate the
practice, including outlawing FGM, in most cases the practice goes unregulated and
undeterred.lo5 In the Matter of M.K., for example, the IJ recognized that the police would not
protect the petitioner from forced FGM; a woman who has experienced forced FGM has no legal
recourse because Sierra Leone has not outlawed FGM and because "it is part of traditional
custom. Complaints to the police would be useless and potentially harmful, because the police
would merely advise the Bundo Society that she had divulged the 'secret.' Divulging the secret

102

UNHCR HAVDBOOK.supra note 62. at para. 65.

'03 Id.

I m Matter of :llc.hfu/len, 19 I&N Dec. 90 (BIA 1975); iWaNer of'Picrre, 15 I&N Dec 161 (BIA 1975). These
holdings are consistent with the decision in the L'c/elasquez-Rodriquez case that "[aln illegal act which violates
human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State (for example. because it is the act of a private
person . . . ) can lead to international responsibility of the State; not because of the act itself. but because of the lack
of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required. Inter-American Court of Human kghts,
July 29. 1988. at 154.
I05
Although Cameroon. Djibouti. Eglpt, Ghana. and the Sudan have outlawed FGM,James. supra note 11, at 206,
the illegalization of the practice has not eradicated it: FGM is still prevalent in Egypt and The Sudan. Moreover,
these laws may prolubit the most extreme form of FGM (infibulation), but may still allow excision and or
clitoridectomy. Karen Hughes. Note. The G.iminalization of Fernale Gen~talMufilarion in the United States, 4.
J.L. & POL'Y321 (1995).
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would result in her being harassed, threatened, physically harmed, and possibly killed."lo6 In this
particular case, M.K. had avoided being mutilated for nearly ten years, but was abducted and had
FGM forcibly inflicted upon her. The IJ found that, although the government did not commit the
persecution itself (that is, the government did not perform the FGM), the government was not
only unwilling or unable to protect the petitioner, but that the government may "facilitate F G M ]
by advising the Bundo Society of women who complain."'07 Because the government acquiesced
in the persecution, the court found that the petitioner was unable to avail herself of state
assistance.
In the strikingly similar case, Matter of J , the IJ found that the government action prong
of the asylum test was not satisfied.lu8 Although the IJ recogized that the persecutor need not be
the government, but could be a group that the government could not control, the IJ failed to
recognize that the tribe could be a persecutor outside the control of the government. What seems
to underlie the IJ's opinion is an assumption, not that the government could not control the tribe,
but that it shotrld not control the tribe because FGM is a cultural practice not viewed as abhorrent
or barbaric by those who practice it,'''

even though, in this case, the FGM was imposed forcibly,

after the petitioner had been abducted, gagged, and b ~ u n d . " ~Thus, despite the petitioner's
personal objection to FGM, the fact that it was forced upon her, and the fact that it is irreversible,
the IJ found that FGM was a tribal matter, essentially out of the purview of the government.
The IJ's determination in the Matter of .I is especially problematic in light of the
"Considerations for Asylum Oficers Adjudicating Asylum Claims for Women" issued by the

IN

.+fatter of M K , supra note 17, at 8.
Id at 13.
'08 Matter ofJ.. supra note 18,at 1376
log Id.
107
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Department of Justice on May 26, 1995. Although these "Considerations" were not issued until a
month after the decision in Mutter of J., and though they are not binding authority, the BIA
should take them into account if this case is appealed. "The relevant issue is whether the woman
applying for asylum was subjected to or reasonably feared being subjected to the violence with no
recourse to state protection. This lack of recourse to state protection may be because the state is
unable or unwilling to provide such protection.""1 What is problematic about the IJ's decision in
Matter of J, then, is that he chose to affirm the government's unwillingness to protect the
petitioner because he perceived the government's rationale for doing so as reasonable.

IV CONCLUSIONS
We should not abdicate our responsibility toward each other as human beings out of fear
of being named cultural imperialists. Rather, that "fear," or concern, should inform our choices
and actions. By employing our concern and our humanity, we can engage in a respectkl and
honest exchange, and create new norms for behavior. It is only in so doing that we, as a global
community, will ever have a chance at eliminating physically and psychologically damaging
practices, such as female genital mutilation

111

Nancy Kelly, et al., Gu~delinesfor Women's A ~ l u mCla~ms.71 INTERPRETER
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